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LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY TO THE UNBORN
By T.

RABER TAYLOR

T. Raber Taylor received his A.B.
degree from Regis College in 1933
and his LL.B. degree from Harvard
Law School in 1936, He has practiced in Denver since 1937 and is a
member of the American, Colorado, and Denver Bar Associations.
Since 1939 he has been the lecturer on medicolegal problems at
the University of Colorado School
of Medicine. He was a member of
the recent planning committee of
the National Conference on the
Le g a I Environment of Medical
Science.
In New Jersey on May 2, 1935, a baby was born permanently
retarded, both mentally and physically. A suit was brought alleging the doctor had negligently misdiagnosed the mother's pregnant condition as tumor.1 X-ray treatments had been given three
times before the baby's birth, the last treatment about six weeks
before the birth.
In 1935 it was known that if a mother had deep X-ray treatment to which a fetus was exposed, the baby could be expected
to have a gravely defective central nervous system. 2 At this time
no New Jersey court had held that a baby had a right to recover
for negligently caused injuries before birth.
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent in every
individual," wrote Sir William Blackstone in 1765, "and it begins in contemplation 3of law as soon as the infant is able to stir
in its mother's womb."
In the ancient Assyrian Code, circa 1500 B.C., 4 the fetus is
spoken of as a human life and cognizance is also taken of the
stages of fetal development. The unborn baby was, under this
and other ancient and later laws, protected by the threat of
penalties: a fine, the lash, and in severe cases, death.
Hippocrates, who lived four centuries before the Christian
era, sought to protect unborn babies from the aborting drugs
of Aspasia by appeal to the consciences of his fellow physicians;
asking them to swear the oath saying, "I will not give to any
woman anything to produce abortion."
In 1935 American criminal and civil law treated an unborn
baby as a person in being for some purposes beneficial to the
1 Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
2 Hobbs, Fetal Tolerance to Roentgen Rays, 54 Radiology 242 (1950); Radiation Induced Mutations
in Mammals, 55 Radiology 581 (1950).
3 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *129.
43 Smith, The Origin and History of Hebrew Law 211 (1931); Belkin, Philo and the Oral Law,
Harvard Semitic Series IX, 131, 132, n. 125.
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baby. Then as today one who feloniously inflicted injuries upon
an unborn baby which was born alive but subsequently died
from the injuries was chargeable under the criminal law with
homicide as in the killing of any human being. Also, the criminal
law generally protects the unborn baby from being intentionally aborted.
The American civil law regards a baby in his mother's
womb as capable of taking a legacy or devise. The word "children" or "issue" as used in a bequest, or a life insurance policy,
or a workmen's compensation act, would include a baby in his
mother's womb. With respect to such property rights posthumous children are regarded as in being from the time of conception.
Did the solicitude of the law for the protection of the unborn babies against the criminal conduct of others and as to
inheritance and property rights prompt New Jersey's highest
court in the Stemmer case to extend the protection to such babies
against the negligence of others? No. In 1942 the long battle
through the courts ended with nine of the fifteen judges of
New Jersey's highest court holding against the right of the defective and crippled child to recover for injuries suffered while
in the womb. Mr. Chief Justice Boggs and five other justices
dissented.5
Another mistaken diagnosis of a pregnancy as a tumor
followed by X-ray therapy reached the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1939.6 This Court followed its 1900 decision in Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital,7 which in turn followed the 1884 majority opinion written by Mr. Justice Holmes in the first American case,
Dietrich v. Northampton." This Massachusetts case involved an
injury between the fourth and fifth month of pregnancy. The
decision rested on two grounds; first, no case had ever decided
that if the unborn baby lived he could sue for injuries received
while in his mother's womb, and, secondly, since the unborn
baby is part of the mother any damage to him which is not too
remote to be recovered is recoverable by her.
In 1924 a lower Pennsylvania court had held that injuries
received through negligence of another entitled the quickened
unborn baby to sue after birth. 9 But this forward-looking approach was disapproved in 1940 in Berlin v. J. C. Penney Co.,1° by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
As early as 1921 a lower New York court attempted to grant
recovery in a similar case," but New York's highest court, following Justice Holmes' opinion, reversed. 2 Justice Cardozo dissented
without giving any reason.
As early as 1901 a legal writer had asked the law to recognize
the legal right of the unborn baby to begin life with a sound
5 Stemmer

v. Kline, 128 NJ.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942).
6 Smith v. Luckhandt, 299 III. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939).
7 184 III. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
8 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
9 Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
10 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
11 Drobner v. Peters, 194 App. Div. 696, 186 N.Y. Supp. 278 (1921).
12 Drebner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
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body. 13 Others urged relief for tort injuries to the unborn baby. 4
By 1941 the reasons for denying recovery were ascribed to two
factors: (1) the practical difficulty of proving causation inviting fictitious claims and (2) the legalistic assumption that a
baby in his mother's womb is owed no duty of care because "it"
is not a person. 5 The injustice of
denying recovery has been
16
emphasized by an English writer.
Before 1935 the Supreme Court of Canada in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille,7 extended to the unborn baby the protection
of the law that recognized his separate existence under the
criminal law and the laws of estates and property rights by allowing recovery against the torts of others. As early as 1923 an intermediate Louisiana court had held that a baby injured in the
ninth month of gestation that died three days after birth had
a right of action as a "child" within the contemplation of the
civil law and the meaning of the civil code, which gives a child
a right of action for personal injuries.',
The injustice of denying recovery to the child, physically
deformed or mentally deficient for life as a result of prenatal injuries caused by the wrongful act of another, continued to haunt
the courts. The first strong precedent to establish the baby's
right to recover came from the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia in 1946.19 This well-reasoned decision gave the precedent needed to ultimately reverse the prior numerical weight
of authority.
This case involved a malpractice claim springing from the
alleged fact that a viable baby was taken from its mother's womb
through professional malpractice, with resultant injury to the
child. It paved the way for later cases involving
tortious injury
20
to the baby in the womb before viability.
In 1949 the Ohio Supreme Court 2' held a viable baby to be a
"person" within the purview of a provision of the state constitution
that "every person, for an injury done him in his person . . . shall
have remedy by due course of law." This was the first decision by an
American court of highest jurisdiction to hold, in the absence of
statute, that a child who survives birth can bring an action for
prenatal injuries. In the same year the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that where independent existence is possible and life is wrongfully destroyed a cause of action arises under the wrongful death
statute. 22 Two years later the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,'2 and also the Supreme Court of Georgia
in Tucker v. Carmichael and Sons,'24 upheld the right of the injured
baby to a claim against the tortfeasor.
13 Note, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 313 (1901).
14 Morris, Injuries to Infants En Ventre So Mere, 58 Cent. L.J. 143 (1904).
15 Prosser, Torts, 174 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 Comb. LJ. 76, 90 (1942).
17 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
18 Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923).
19 Bonbrest v. Katz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
20 A viable fetus is one sufficiently developed to survive outside the womb. Whether a fetus of
six, or eight months or younger is viable depends an all the facts, including the nature of the pediatric
care available.
21 William v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
22 Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
23 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
24 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
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In 1951, New York's highest court in Woods v. Lancet 25 overruled its 1921 decision in the Drobner case 26 and held the baby had
a cause of action for prenatal injury which occurred during the
ninth month of his mother's pregnancy.
The shadow of Holmes was fading. The logic and the respect
for human life shown by dissenting Chief Justice Boggs in Allaire
v. St. Luke's Hospital27 was making new precedents. In Steggal v.
Morris28 the Supreme Court of Missouri specifically overruled its
earlier decision in Buel v. United Rys. Co. 29 In 1953 Boggs' reasoning was adopted by his successors on the Illinois court in the case
of Amann v. Faidy3° which overruled Allaire after more than fifty
years.
1
Additional states, Kentucky and Oregon among others,3
adopted the modern view and allowed recovery. This enlightened
view rejected the old argument that it is too difficult to prove or
disprove the causation of injury to an unborn baby, and found the
difficulty of proof neither special to this type of claim, nor relevant
to a determination of the right to sue.
In 1957 the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Poliquin v.
Macdonald,32 held that a viable baby injured in his mother's womb
25 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
26232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
27 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
28363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
29248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913).
3o415 III. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
31 Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291
P.2d 225 (1956).
8= 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
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and born alive, or dying in his mother's womb, could have an action brought in his name against the negligent person. In the following year the same court was asked to decide whether a negligent
injury to a baby in his mother's womb before viability had a cause
of action when he lived to sue." In this recent decision, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court held that "an infant born alive can
maintain an action to recover for prenatal injuries inflicted upon
it by the tort of another even if it'' had not reached the state of a
viable fetus at the time of injury. 34
The New York court in Kelly v. Gregory,35 a case in which the
injury took place during the third month of pregnancy, said that,
"If the child born after an injury sustained at any period of his
prenatal life can prove the effect on him or the tort ... we hold he
makes out a right to recover. ' 36 In 1956 the Supreme Court of
Georgia in Hornbuckle v. PlantationPipe Line Company,3 7 where
the injury took place in the sixth week of pregnancy, held, "where
a child is born after a tortious injury3' 8sustained at any period after
conception, he has a cause of action.
These three modern precedents illustrate how the law has
caught up with the scientific finding that the embryo from the time
of conception becomes a separate being and remains so throughout
its life.3 9 Medical experience has discovered that the mother's contribution from conception
on is to furnish nourishment and pro40
tection for her baby.
The new rule of tort law that a baby is to be considered as in
being from the time of conception in his mother's womb reflects the
respect for human life found in the recent oaths of doctors.
The pertinent sentence in the Geneva version of the Hippocratic Oath, as adopted by the World Medical Association, comprising thirty-nine national medical societies including the American Medical Association, reads: "I will maintain the utmost respect
for human life from the time of its conception." The International
Code of Medical Ethics in defining the doctor's duty speaks to his
conscience in these words: "A doctor must always bear in mind
the importance of preserving human life from the time of conception until death."
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,"
said the 1881 pragmatic philosophy of Holmes. 41 To the student
seeking knowledge of the common law, he cautioned: "In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends
to become." In 1959 the common law, rejecting Holmes, tends to
give the unborn baby in his mother's womb, from the time of conception, the benefit of his separate being and a legal claim for
tortious injury by others.
By 1965 Blackstone's 1765 statement 42 may be corrected to
33 Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958).
34 Id. at 110.
35 282 App. Div. 542, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953).
36 125 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
37 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
38 93 S.E.2d at 728.
39 Baxter, Frazer's Manual of Embryology 1 (3d ed. 1953).
40 Malay, Legal Anatomy and Surgery 668 (1930); Patten, Human Embryology 181 (1946); Cunningham, Anatomy 7 (6th ed. 1931).
41 Hotmes, The Common Low 1 (1951).
42 See note 3 supra.
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read: "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent in. every
individual; and with the advance findings of medical science that
an embryo is a separate being from his mother, from the moment
of conception, life begins in contemplation of law as soon as the
baby is conceived in his mother's womb."
What will be the law in Colorado? Richard John Marquez, by
his father as next friend, brought a claim in Denver District Court
against a doctor alleging prenatal injury due to malpractice causing a brain injury which "caused him to be mentally retarded and
to have a spastic condition, which condition will be permanent
throughout" his life.4 3 He asked for $500,000 damages. A motion
to dismiss was filed based on the theory that no recovery could be
had for prenatal injury. The attorneys for Richard invoked Sections 3 and 6 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution declaring,
"All persons have .certain natural, essential and inalienable rights
among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying . . . their
lives . . ." and "Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and
a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person . . . ." They
further claimed that these sections were at least equal to the Ohio
Constitutional provisions in William v. Marion Rapid Transit,
Inc.44 No decision was rendered. The case was settled.
Prenatal injury to the unborn, in the future as in the past, may
be caused by such things as auto collisions, induced premature labor,
negligent use of forceps during delivery, excess use of drugs during
delivery, and radiation from X-ray. To what extent fall-out from
atomic tests will cause subsequent developmental defects in unborn
babies and result in tort claims cannot at this time be predicted.
Certainly imagination indicates such claims as possibilities. This
whole subject should be put on the 1965 calendar, thirty years from
the Stemmer case, 200 years from Blackstone's statement, and revisited. Critical legal reasoning, aided by increased medical knowledge, is widening the rights of the unborn baby tortiously injured.
43 Marquez v. Ashmun, Civil No. A-86771, Denver District Court (Dec. 26, 1952).
44 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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